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PLAIN LANGUAGE V. COMMON SENSE: 
EXAMINING THE PROBLEMATIC DECISION 
IN IN RE VILLAGE AT CAMP BOWIE I, L.P., 
AND THE HARM IT WILL CAUSE FUTURE 
CREDITORS 
Brett D. Young 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, a plan of reorganization can be 
“crammed down” the throats of non-consenting creditors, but only if 
the propounding party finds at least one class of “impaired” creditors 
who will consent to the cramdown plan.1 A problem arises when 
courts define the word “impairment”: does it mean genuinely “hurt,” 
or does it mean simply “altered,” even when the alteration is not 
really detrimental to the allegedly “impaired” class? The latter 
definition allows parties to cram down reorganization plans using the 
controversial technique of artificial impairment.2 Artificial 
impairment is the “technique of minimally impairing a class of 
creditors solely to create an impaired accepting class and to satisfy 
[sic] prerequisite to cramdown of Chapter 11 plan.”3 Congress and 
the Supreme Court are silent on whether the Bankruptcy Code allows 
artificial impairment,4 giving lower courts the power to rule on 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School; B.A. History and Psychology, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, June 2012. I am extremely grateful to Professor Dan 
Schechter for his constant encouragement, guidance, and passion for teaching, all of which made 
this comment possible. Thank you to the talented and dedicated staff and editors of the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work. Finally, I cannot thank my family and friends 
enough for all their love and support.  
 1.  See Richard M. Cieri et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm 
a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part II), 3 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 115, 146 (1994).   
 2.  Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial 
Classification or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 310–12 (1992). 
 3.  5 BANKR. SERV. LAW. EDITION (West) § 45:103 (Jan. 2014). 
 4.  Dan Schechter, Artificial Impairment of Small Class of Unsecured Creditors Is 
Insufficient to Support Cramdown Plan of Reorganization [Federal National Mortgage 
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artificial impairment as they see fit.5  
Artificial impairment is a problematic development in Chapter 
11 reorganization plans. The guidelines presented in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129 set forth the requirements for approval of a bankruptcy 
reorganization plan;6 all impaired creditors must unanimously 
approve the reorganization plan.7 However, under § 1129(b), an 
exception allows a single class of creditors to approve a 
reorganization plan in accordance with § 1129(a)(10).8 A plan 
approved by this method is often known as a “cramdown” 
reorganization plan because it is approved by a single vote, despite 
the objection of the other classes.9 Thus, a cramdown plan permits a 
single class of creditors to approve the plan, but only if the 
consenting class is impaired as defined by § 1124.10 
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Village at 
Camp Bowie I, L.P.11 elected to follow Ninth Circuit precedent when 
confronted with a reorganization plan that was confirmed by a 
potentially artificially impaired class of creditors.12 As part of its 
decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the position taken by the 
Eighth Circuit, which advocated for a motive-based inquiry into the 
reasons a class was impaired to prevent plans from being confirmed 
by artificial impairment.13 Thus, in line with the Ninth Circuit,14 the 
Fifth Circuit refused to distinguish between artificial and need-based 
impairments.15 In choosing to follow the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth 
Circuit has taken a position that not only damages a creditor’s rights 
 
Association v. Village I, GP (W.D. Tenn. 2012).], COM. FIN. NEWSL., Jan. 28, 2013 (“Congress 
has had numerous opportunities since 1993 to reject ‘artificial impairment’ and has not done so. 
Arguably, that inaction is an implicit ratification of the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Perhaps the 
Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the emerging circuit split.”). 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). 
 7.  Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
 8.  Id. § 1129(a)(10) (setting forth the provision that the plan must be confirmed by the 
court if “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan”). 
 9.  Cieri, supra note 1, at 147. 
 10.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). The standard in § 1124 defines impairment simply as the 
alteration of a creditor’s rights. Id. § 1124. 
 11.  W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp 
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 12.  Id.; L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim 
Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 13.  Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on 
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 127 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 14.  In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 940. 
 15.  In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245. 
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in the case at hand but sets a dangerous precedent for creditors who 
are forced to accept cramdown reorganization plans on unfair terms. 
This Comment addresses the controversial issue of artificial 
impairment and seeks to establish that courts should refuse to allow 
artificially impaired classes to approve cramdown reorganization 
plans. Part II details the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Village at 
Camp Bowie I, L.P. and its adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s rule 
regarding artificial impairment. Part III explains the split among 
bankruptcy courts over artificial impairment by analyzing statutes 
and Eighth and Ninth Circuit precedent.16 Part IV argues that the 
correct interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) includes a motive-based 
inquiry into the reasons for impairment, to satisfy the legislative 
intent and history of the Bankruptcy Code and to protect future 
creditors. Finally, Part V concludes that courts should not interpret 
the Bankruptcy Code using the strict textualist approach used by the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits,17 and that courts facing this problem in the 
future should adopt the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (“Village”) acquired a parcel of 
property in 2004, and began investing in improvements to make the 
property more suitable for office and retail space.18 To finance the 
project, Village infused a large sum of its own capital into the 
project, but it also obtained a loan from a bank in exchange for a 
promissory note secured by the real property.19 Through a series of 
conveyances, Western Real Estate Equities (“Western”) came to hold 
the note.20 After Village defaulted on the loan payment in August 
2010, Western decided to hold a non-judicial foreclosure for the sale 
of the property.21 Prior to the foreclosure proceedings, Village filed a 
Chapter 11 petition staying the foreclosure sale.22 
In November 2010, Village filed its original plan of 
 
 16.  Id.; In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 940; In re Windsor on the River Assocs., 
Ltd., 7 F.3d at 127. 
 17.  In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 239; In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 
F.2d at 940. 
 18.  In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 242. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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reorganization under Chapter 11, but the court rejected the plan 
because the insufficient equity infusion could not stabilize the 
property.23 After a series of amendments, Village filed its second 
reorganization plan, which the court approved after a cramdown 
vote.24 The plan consisted of two classes of impaired creditors: 
Western and a group of unsecured trade creditors who had performed 
various jobs at the property.25 As part of the reorganization plan, 
Western would receive a new five-year note in the amount of its 
claim, with interest set at 5.84 percent per annum and a balloon 
payment due at maturity.26 Additionally, the plan proposed to pay the 
unsecured trade creditors in full within three months of the plan’s 
approval, but the payment would not include interest—an amount 
totaling approximately $900.27 
Western objected to the plan, arguing that Village only impaired 
the trade claims minimally, and that it did so to secure the necessary 
vote to cram down the plan under § 1129(a)(10).28 In other words, 
Western argued that Village artificially impaired the trade creditors’ 
claim to cram down the plan. The bankruptcy court rejected 
Western’s argument, stating that § 1129(a)(10) did not distinguish 
between “artificial impairment and economically driven 
impairment.”29 Western appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.30 
On appeal, Western again asserted its theory that a debtor could 
not artificially impair a voting class of creditors to secure an 
approving vote in a reorganization plan.31 The appellate court 
analyzed this argument by assessing the two views of artificial 
impairment adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.32 The court 
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s application of § 1129(a)(10), which 
distinguished between economic and artificial impairment, in favor 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 242–43. 
 25.  Id. at 243. 
 26.  Id. The amount owed on the promissory note to Western at the time the case was heard 
was $32,112,711, compared to the $59,398 owed to the trade creditors. Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 244. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 244–45. 
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of the Ninth Circuit’s plain reading of the statute.33 The court 
declared that “the Bankruptcy Code must be read literally, and 
congressional intent is relevant only when the statutory language is 
ambiguous.”34 In adopting the Ninth Circuit’s precedent and 
reasoning, the court rejected Western’s argument, refusing to 
distinguish between artificial impairment and any other type of 
impairment.35 Consequently, it upheld confirmation of the plan.36 
III.  HISTORY OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN 
 THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS 
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Village at Camp 
Bowie I, L.P.,37 the Eighth and Ninth Circuits opposed each other on 
the issue of artificial impairment.38 To fully understand the flaw in 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision39 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision,40 it is 
necessary to review the Bankruptcy Code and analyze the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits’ holdings. 
A.  Statutes 
The problem of artificial impairment arises in Chapter 11 
reorganization plans.41 Once a debtor files for bankruptcy protection 
and chooses to pursue a reorganization plan, there are two ways to 
confirm a plan of reorganization: consensually or under a 
“cramdown” scenario.42 In a consensual plan, all of the § 1129(a) 
requirements must be met.43 This includes § 1129(a)(8), which 
requires either that every class of creditors accept the plan or that no 
non-consenting class is impaired.44 Thus, if there is an impaired  
 
 33.  Id. at 245. 
 34.  Id. at 246. 
 35.  Id. at 245–46. 
 36.  Id. at 248. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 
995 F.2d 940, 942–43 (9th Cir. 1993); Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., v. Balcor Real Estate 
Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 130–31 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 39.  See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245. 
 40.  In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 942–43. 
 41.  See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 310–11. 
 42.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)-(b) (2012). 
 43.  Id. § 1129(a). 
 44.  Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
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non-consenting class, the plan cannot be confirmed.45 
However, if § 1129(a)(8) cannot be satisfied, the propounding 
party (usually, but not always, the debtor) can fall back on the 
cramdown provisions of § 1129(b).46 Under § 1129(b)(1), a plan can 
still be confirmed if all of the other elements of § 1129(a), other than 
subsection (a)(8), are satisfied.47 Therefore, the § 1129(a)(10) 
requirement that there be at least one impaired class vote to approve 
the plan applies under § 1129(b).48 In other words, even if there are 
some impaired but non-consenting classes of creditors, the plan can 
still be confirmed under the cramdown provisions as long as there is 
at least one impaired consenting class.49 
Section 1124 determines whether the required claim for a 
cramdown plan is impaired.50 This statute provides that a claim will 
not be considered impaired unless the creditor’s rights are left 
“unaltered” by the reorganization plan.51 The problem of artificial 
impairment thus arises from reorganization plans confirmed under 
§ 1129(a)(10), because § 1124’s alteration standard provides 
minimal guidance on the definition of impairment.52 Additionally, 
§ 1124 does not discuss artificial impairment, or whether there 
should be any type of judicial probe into the reasons for impairing a 
creditor’s claim.53 
Using a strict textualist interpretation of these reorganization 
statutes, debtors may strategically alter the claim of a class of 
creditors to secure an approving vote for their reorganization plan.54 
If, for example, a debtor delayed payment under a plan to a class of 
unsecured creditors for a few months and denied them a small 
interest payment, a court applying a strict textualist approach to the 
 
 45.  See id. § 1129(a). 
 46.  Id. § 1129(b). 
 47.  Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 48.  Id. § 1129(a)(10). 
 49.  See id. § 1129(a)(10), (b)(1). 
 50.  Id. § 1124. 
 51.  Id. (“[A] class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each 
claim or interest of such class, the plan[:] (1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual 
rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest . . . .”); Cieri, 
supra note 1, at 118. 
 52.  For example, some courts have interpreted § 1124 to mean that even a creditor whose 
interests were improved can be considered impaired on the theory that the improved claim has 
been “altered.” E.g., In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R. 910, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). 
 53.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b). 
 54.  Cieri, supra note 1, at 148. 
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statutes would consider this claim altered, and thus impaired.55 In 
this example, the class of unsecured creditors—whose claim is 
minimally and “artificially” impaired by the plan—can cram down 
the plan despite another creditor’s objections, regardless of the large 
disparity between the amounts owed to each party by the debtor.56 
B.  Circuit Split 
In In re Windsor On the River Associates, Ltd.,57 the Eighth 
Circuit refused to uphold a bankruptcy reorganization plan approved 
by an artificially impaired class of debtors.58 The court reasoned that 
Congress intended § 1129 to promote consensual reorganization, and 
concluded that it would be “odd” if certain creditors could 
circumvent consensual reorganization through artificial 
impairment.59 Additionally, the court stated in dicta that one of the 
primary functions of the Bankruptcy Code was to discourage side 
dealing, something that would surely occur if debtors were permitted 
to manufacture impairment to garner approval of a reorganization 
plan.60 
As part of its holding, the Eighth Circuit declared that satisfying 
§ 1124 requires a factual inquiry into whether the debtor manipulated 
the terms of the plan to secure an approving vote using 
§ 1129(a)(10).61 Although the court failed to articulate the exact test 
it would apply to determine whether the debtor’s manipulation 
resulted in genuine impairment,62 other courts have interpreted the 
holding to require economic necessity for the impairment.63 
 
 55.  See Clarkson v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co. (In re Clarkson), 767 F.2d 417, 418 n.1 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
 56.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10); id. § 1124. 
 57.  Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on 
the River Assocs.), 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 58.  Id. at 132. 
 59.  Id. at 131. 
 60.  Id. at 132. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See In re Windsor On the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re 
Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 63.  W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp 
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2013). Other courts have used the same interpretation 
of the Eighth Circuit’s standard. See, e.g., In re Ridgewood Apartments of DeKalb Cnty., Ltd., 
183 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995); In re Gramercy Twins Assocs., 187 B.R. 112, 118 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re W.C. Peeler Co., Inc., 182 B.R. 435, 437 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995); In 
re Inv. Fla. Aggressive Growth Fund, Ltd., 168 B.R. 760, 766–67 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994). 
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Taking a strict textualist approach, the Ninth Circuit, in In re  
L & J Anaheim Associates, defined impairment using § 1124’s plain 
language.64 As a result, the court chose to uphold the reorganization 
plan even though it was proposed and approved by an artificially 
impaired class of creditors in a cramdown vote.65 The proposed plan 
compelled the sale of the real property at issue to pay off creditors.66 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the plan’s confirmation because the 
creditor, who proposed and voted to approve the plan, lost 
contractual remedies available to it against the debtor as a result of 
the sale.67 The plan’s proponent satisfied § 1124’s alteration 
requirement because the creditor lost these previously available 
contractual remedies.68 The court disregarded the fact that the 
creditor attempted to foreclose in the first place but was prevented 
from doing so when the debtor filed for bankruptcy,69 and instead 
chose to focus its reasoning on the plain satisfaction of the statute.70 
Most importantly, the court’s decision has been interpreted to mean 
that a creditor’s rights are impaired when they are altered and not 
necessarily harmed.71 The Fifth Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s 
definition of impairment in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. to 
preclude a motive-based inquiry into why Village impaired the trade 
creditors’ claim, because the court determined the creditors’ rights 
were altered.72 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Using § 1129(a)(10), Village crammed down the reorganization 
plan despite the objections of Western, whose secured interest had a 
value more than fifty times the amount owed to the trade creditors.73 
As this large disparity in value demonstrates, courts must look 
beyond the plain language of the statute to ensure that they fairly 
 
 64.  L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 
995 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Schechter, supra note 4. 
 72.  W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C., v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp 
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 73.  Id. 
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approve reorganization plans. The Fifth Circuit, then, erred by 
following the Ninth Circuit’s strict textualist approach. By strictly 
adhering to the Bankruptcy Code’s language, the Fifth Circuit 
ignored why the Bankruptcy Code permits cramdown plans and 
harmed future creditors in bankruptcy reorganization plans. 
A.  The Bankruptcy Code Should Be Read  
to Require a “Harmed” Rather Than “Altered”  
Standard of Impairment 
Courts often demonize cramdown reorganization plans because 
such plans do not reflect the goal of consensual reorganizations that 
the Bankruptcy Code purports to champion.74 However, courts have 
justified the use of cramdown reorganizations in cases where the 
consenting class is “also hurt and nonetheless favors the plan.”75 
When a class of creditors that is actually hurt by the plan still favors 
the plan, a court can infer that the plan is fair because those creditors 
presumably voted in good faith in favor of reorganization, rather than 
liquidation.76 
A historical analysis of the circumstances leading up to the 
creation of the modern § 1129 further supports the idea that the 
statute requires the plan to “hurt” an approving creditor.77 According 
to 11 U.S.C. § 861, the predecessor to § 1129, a party could cram 
down a reorganization plan as long as the mortgagee, the party 
making the loan for a mortgage on real property, received the 
appraised value of the property.78 The statute treated the mortgagee 
as a consenting class whose consent could be used to approve a 
reorganization plan.79 Plans approved using this technique were often 
extremely inequitable, because debtors could make cash payments 
for real property in depressed markets for a value equal to the 
 
 74.  In re 266 Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing 
the path to cramdown reorganization as “torturous”), aff’d sub nom. In re Washington Assocs., 
147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 312 (stating that Chapter 11’s goal is “to 
foster plans of reorganizations which are consensual to the greatest possible extent”). 
 75.  Cieri, supra note 1, at 147. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on 
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir. 1993); Cieri, supra note 1, at 147. 
 78.  11 U.S.C. § 861 (1976). 
 79.  In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d at 131. 
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depressed appraised value.80 This forced the creditor to accept the 
reorganization plan, no matter how inequitable.81 
Congress sought to prevent this type of inequitable result by 
amending the Bankruptcy Code in 1984.82 The changes to the Code 
allocated power to creditors in reorganization plans by explicitly 
requiring the accepting class to be impaired.83 That is, a creditor 
receiving the depressed market value of the property in the situation 
mentioned above would not be considered impaired and, thus, could 
not be used to approve a cramdown plan.84 This congressional 
history indicates an intent to empower creditors in cramdown plans, 
whereas artificial impairment weakens larger creditors in 
reorganization plans, contrary to congressional intent. The Fifth 
Circuit failed to address any of the statutory history surrounding the 
1984 amendment.85 Instead, the court reasoned that the statute must 
be read as written, unless there are ambiguities.86 
The Ninth Circuit largely ignored these policy concerns with its 
plain-language reading of the statute,87 leading the Fifth Circuit to 
make the same mistake.88 Because the Fifth Circuit did not require 
that the plan “hurt” the consenting class, Village was able to 
gerrymander a consenting class’s approval using artificial 
impairment.89 Under the plan, the trade creditors’ claim was 
impaired but definitely not “harmed,” because the plan guaranteed 
the creditors nearly full payment within three months of 
confirmation.90 The only loss the creditors suffered under the plan 
was $900 in interest payments.91 
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion better reflects the underlying 
rationale of the Bankruptcy Code. By rejecting artificial impairment 
and looking into the reasons that a plan impairs a creditor’s claims, 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Meltzer, supra note 2, at 312. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 312–13. 
 85.  See W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C., v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp 
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 86.  Id. at 246. 
 87.  See L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim 
Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 88.  In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245. 
 89.  See id. at 243–47. 
 90.  Id. at 243. 
 91.  See id. at 243 n.3. 
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the Eighth Circuit’s opinion ensures that the class of creditors 
approving the plan was genuinely harmed.92 In its opinion, the 
Eighth Circuit stated that a creditor’s claim would not be considered 
impaired by a reorganization plan if “the alteration of rights in 
question arises solely from the debtor’s exercise of discretion.”93 
Consequently, in the Eighth Circuit, an inquiry is necessary to 
determine if the plan actually hurts a party in order to satisfy the 
underlying policy of the statute.94 
In In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., there is no question that 
the plan impaired the trade creditors’ rights under § 1124,95 but the 
problem arises when the reason for impairment is examined. 
Village’s decision to withhold payment from the unsecured creditors 
was, without more information, an act of pure discretion. This can be 
inferred from the fact that Village’s pre-petition owners had to infuse 
$1.5 million into the business as part of the plan, giving them the 
cash on hand to pay off the small claim held by the trade creditors.96 
As a result, the Eighth Circuit would have rejected the plan because, 
on its face, there was no compelling reason to delay payment to the 
trade creditors.97 It is important to mention that by rejecting the 
Eighth Circuit’s test, the Fifth Circuit never looked into why Village 
impaired the rights of the unsecured creditors.98 It is entirely possible 
that there was an economic reason aside from discretion for 
impairing the trade creditors’ rights, but that question will remain 
unanswered. The court’s limited reading of the statute denies any 
further inquiry into the debtor’s motive for the chosen impairment. 
B.  Adopting Ninth Circuit Precedent  
Will Harm Future Creditors. 
The failure of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to consider the 
consequences of the strict textualist approach that they have adopted 
is a huge shortcoming of both opinions.99 One particularly chilling 
 
 92.  Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on 
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012). 
 96.  In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 243. 
 97.  11 U.S.C. § 1124. 
 98.  See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245–48. 
 99.  W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C., v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp 
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effect of these courts’ application of § 1129(a)(10) is that it would 
encourage debtors to view the statute as an alternative to refinancing 
when debtors are unable to refinance on the open market.100 If a 
debtor knows that it can use the Bankruptcy Code to reorganize its 
debt using artificial impairment, the debtor is more likely to 
refinance in this manner than on the open market, especially if the 
project lacks financial promise.101 Furthermore, permitting artificial 
impairment would certainly lead to side dealing between creditors 
and debtors.102 Scenarios where a debtor would seek out the 
approving vote of a small, unsecured class of creditors in exchange 
for a beneficial reorganization plan would become common. 
Unfortunately, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits failed to address any 
of these possible concerns. Instead, they chose to ignore the huge 
impact their decisions will have on creditors’ rights in the future. 
Perhaps the most problematic development associated with the 
Ninth Circuit’s precedent is that it entirely swallows consensual 
reorganization plans promoted under § 1129(a).103 As Meltzer 
suggests, “Plan proponents could circumvent the impairment 
requirement at will by impairing creditors in trivial ways. As we 
have seen, a mere temporary delay in payment can constitute 
impairment. A 99% payment constitutes impairment. Even enhanced 
treatment constitutes impairment.”104 Debtors working to secure a 
reorganization plan will always find a way to impair a class of 
creditors who would be willing to approve a mutually beneficial 
reorganization plan. As a result, § 1129(a) would serve no purpose 
because all reorganization plans would be approved using the 
cramdown provision. This would render a large secured creditor’s 
vote meaningless because they are always impaired under the plan, 
and never the party sought by the debtor to secure a cramdown 
plan.105 
It is inferred from the Eighth Circuit’s opinion that courts should 
 
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013); L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, 
Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 100.  Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on 
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012). 
 104.  Meltzer, supra note 2, at 319. 
 105.  See, e.g., In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 243; In re L & J Anaheim 
Assocs., 995 F.2d at 942–43. 
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investigate the reasons a plan impaired a creditor’s rights, to prevent 
artificial impairment and protect creditors’ rights from the harms 
mentioned above.106 Some scholars argue that imposing a  
court-based inquiry into the motivations behind impairment will lead 
to problematic results.107 For example, opponents of the Eighth 
Circuit decision argue that all impairment results from discretion, 
and no matter what kind of economic framework or reason is 
presented, the impairment of a creditor is solely based on debtor 
discretion.108 This argument, like the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ 
approaches, takes textualism to the extreme. Of course all 
impairment will result from discretion, but the Eighth Circuit 
decision sought to add to the statute a fact-finding inquiry to the 
reasons behind the exercise of discretion.109 To receive court 
approval of a plan, a debtor need only justify the reasons for 
impairing a creditor’s claim, but that justification cannot include 
manufacturing a consenting class.110 
In his article On the River of Artificial and Arbitrary 
Impairment: An Erroneous Analysis,111 Eric W. Lam presents a 
particularly harmful interpretation of the Eighth Circuit opinion 
using a hypothetical.112 His hypothetical outlines a bankruptcy 
reorganization plan that includes a debtor who will use incoming 
cash flow, from revenue generated by the business, to repay a loan to 
a secured creditor over the course of ten years without an infusion of 
capital.113 Additionally, the plan calls for repayment of an unsecured 
class of creditors’ claims totaling $13,000 over the course of two 
years, also using revenue from the business.114 A projection 
estimates that, after paying all of its monthly obligations and 
operating the business, the business will have a cash surplus of 
$13,000 after the first month, enough to pay the class of unsecured 
 
 106.  See Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor 
on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993).  
 107.  Eric W. Lam, On the River of Artificial and Arbitrary Impairment: An Erroneous 
Analysis, 70 N.D. L. REV. 993, 1003 (1994). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d at 132. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Lam, supra note 107. 
 112.  Id. at 1001–02. 
 113.  Id. at 1001. 
 114.  Id. 
PLAIN LANGUAGE V. COMMON SENSE 11/15/2014  1:16 PM 
1100 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1087 
trade creditors.115 Lam suggests that if the debtor decided to use the 
excess capital to invest in the business for improvements, a court 
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s opinion would view this decision as an 
act of discretion that qualified as artificial impairment.116 As a result, 
Lam believes that the court would not approve a vote from these 
creditors to cram down the plan, because the creditors’ impairment 
was based solely on the debtor’s discretion.117 
Lam’s reasoning appears to be flawed. If the business were 
dependent on the improvements to create the revenue necessary to 
pay both classes of creditors under the reorganization plan, the court 
would have determined this necessity during its inquiry, and would 
not have viewed this solely as an exercise of discretion.118 The 
hypothetical suggested by Lam is a perfect example of a situation 
where an inquiry-based analysis of the reasons for impairment would 
be extremely effective, rather than the opposite as he suggests.119 It is 
very unlikely that a court would find the investment of capital back 
into the business to constitute a “technique” of the debtor to “create 
an impaired accepting class.”120 Instead, a court faced with this 
hypothetical would find that the plan necessarily impaired unsecured 
creditors’ rights, giving the indicia of fairness needed by the statutes 
for a cramdown reorganization plan’s approval. Indeed, the court 
could approve the plan knowing that the debtor’s reason for 
impairing the creditor’s claim was not to secure a consenting vote, 
but instead a necessary business decision. 
Instead of making a specific inquiry into the precise reason for 
the impairment as the Eighth Circuit advocated, the Fifth Circuit 
relied on the provision contained in § 1129(a)(3),121 which requires 
that a party propose his or her reorganization plan in good faith.122 
Under that global approach, if the bankruptcy court finds that a party 
proposed the plan in good faith, no other inquiry into a debtor’s 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 1002. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See W. Real Estate Equities, Inc. v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp 
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2013); Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor 
Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 119.  Lam, supra note 107, at 1001–03. 
 120.  Cieri et al., supra note 1, at 148. 
 121.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012). 
 122.  In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247. 
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motive for impairing the claims of a class of creditors is necessary.123 
This cannot be the standard that bankruptcy courts adopt because it 
places too much power in the debtor’s hands and drastically reduces 
a larger creditor’s control during the reorganization process.124 
Overall, good faith is a sloppy standard that is much easier to satisfy 
than a need-based review.125 While good faith might be an 
alternative to the artificial impairment problem, it is not a total or 
desirable solution. Bad faith and artificial impairment are not 
synonyms.126 The bankruptcy court in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, 
L.P. found that Village proposed the plan in good faith, despite the 
clear artificial impairment involved in the case.127 Adopting the good 
faith argument places some limitations on artificial impairment, but 
is not a complete bar like a need-based review would be. To properly 
adjudicate disputes involving artificial impairment, courts must not 
rely on the low bar of good faith used by the Fifth Circuit. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly took a staunch textualist approach 
to its reading of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Fifth Circuit 
incorrectly followed that precedent. Such precedent has a damaging 
effect on large, undersecured creditors in the approval of bankruptcy 
reorganization plans. The Fifth Circuit decision takes textualism to 
the extreme and ignores the reasons that cramdown reorganizations 
are permitted under § 1129(a)(10).128 When Congress created the 
modern § 1129, it was conscious of past problems created by 
cramdown reorganization plans.129 Although the express language of 
the statute does not require courts to look into the reasons a plan 
impaired a creditor’s claim, courts like the Eighth Circuit correctly 
imported this kind of inquiry into the statute, and for good reason. 
The split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is well 
 
 123.  Id. at 248. 
 124.  See id. at 247–48; L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J 
Anaheim Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940, 942–43 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 125. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247–48; In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R. 
910, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). 
 126. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247–48. 
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established.130 The Fifth Circuit decision is the most recent to take a 
side on the issue of gerrymandering a voting class using the 
Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provision.131 As the growing split 
indicates, this is a contentious issue and the Supreme Court must take 
action and overturn the Ninth Circuit’s precedent,132 clarifying the 
issue for courts that face it in the future. 
 
 
 130.  The list of cases opting to follow the Eighth Circuit is growing rapidly.  See, e.g., In re 
All Land Invs., LLC, 468 B.R. 676, 690 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); In re Daly, 167 B.R. 734, 737 
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1994). 
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995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993). 
